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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
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To implement the capabilities conceptualized in Joint Vision 2020, complex, secure 
networks of weapon systems, intelligence platforms, and command and control mechanisms 
must be seamlessly integrated and maintained over time.  Accurate and timely information will 
enable Joint Vision 2020 key tenets: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused 
Logistics, and Full Dimensional Protection.  These networks are central warfighting platforms in 
the information age. 
As these capabilities are developed over time in an evolutionary manner, interoperability 
on the Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) networks is essential, and both hardware and software 
systems must be designed in an Open-systems Architecture (OA) fashion to accommodate the 
vast number of changes anticipated.  Professional Program Management will be needed to 
successfully develop these key warfighting platforms. 
Materiel Developers will need to recognize the relatively immature nature of the software 
engineering domains and actively compensate for this immaturity.  System software 
performance capabilities must be much more detailed than typical hardware-centric systems, as 
the current state of software engineering disciplines is unlikely to satisfy implied, yet critical 
performance requirements.  Essential OA performance characteristics including Maintainability, 
Upgradability, Interfaces/Interoperability, Reliability, Safety and Security (MUIRSS) must be fully 
analyzed and clearly communicated to the software developer to ensure the DoD obtains the 
flexibility and longevity desired from NCW systems. 
Keywords: Net-Centric Warfare, Interoperability, Open Systems Architecture, Software 








Joint Vision 2020 is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guiding document for 
development of the future force and warfighting capabilities.  It states, “If our Armed Forces are 
to be faster, more lethal, and more precise in 2020 than they are today, we must continue to 
invest in and develop new military capabilities.”  It continues, dictating, “The overall focus of this 
vision is full spectrum dominance—achieved through the interdependent application of dominant 
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection” (CJCS, 
2000, pp. 1-2).  The key word is ”interdependent,” as it prescribes interoperability requirements 
to a level never before achieved.  Flexible networks of complex system-of-systems must be 
successfully developed to realize this vision. 
To implement the concepts presented in Joint Vision 2020, the Director of Force 
Transformation anticipates a new era:  
As the world enters a new millennium, our military simultaneously enters a new era in 
warfare—an era in which warfare is affected by a changing strategic environment and 
rapid technological change.  The United States and our multinational partners are 
experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age.  Simultaneously, 
we are fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization.  
These changes, as well as the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military 
operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric 
warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. (2005, p. 3)   
This quote from The Implementation of Network-centric Warfare clearly indicates the 
direction that the DoD is taking in developing the next generation’s warfighting capabilities.  The 
success of the initial NCW systems deployed since Desert Storm, as limited as they were, 
revealed the potential battlespace domination offered through networked systems providing 
situational and information superiority.  One major challenge in constructing effective NCW 
systems is designing the network to seamlessly integrate existing, planned and future platforms 
and systems into a secure, fully interoperable, near real-time information system.  The network 
will need to accommodate complex systems that may or may not have been designed to 
interoperate.  The networked systems themselves are extremely complex and will have been 
developed decades apart.  The network design must be open, flexible and able to adapt to this 
wide disparity of system-of-systems. 
It is well understood that an Open-systems Architecture (OA) design is required to meet 
both current and future warfighting needs and is a critical element in net-centric warfare 
systems-of-systems concepts.  These highly integrated systems are increasingly dependent on 
software solutions for integration into the net-centric scheme; therefore, software interfaces are 
one of the main keys for achieving the tactical and strategic synergies of the net-centric system.  
This paper will focus on the challenges presented when the Department of Defense (DoD) 
conducts capabilities analysis and derives performance specifications for a software-intensive, 
net-centric, system-of-systems architecture that meets OA needs throughout the life of the 
system. 
You got to be careful if you don’t know where you’re going, because you might not get 
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The DoD Performance Specification development process transforms the warfighter 
requirements into terms that are more understandable for the system developer, usually the 
prime contractor.  Typically, the system performance requirements are decomposed through at 
least three levels using the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) methodology.  The concept is to 
provide the contractor sufficient detail with regard to performance, constraints, and intended 
environments without stifling innovative solutions to meeting those requirements.  The number 
of WBS levels developed by the DoD is dependent on the complexity of the system and the 
engineering domain maturity.  For example, the automotive engineering discipline is very 
mature, and a level three WBS for a tactical truck system would most probably be sufficient.  To 
determine whether the WBS is ready to hand off to a contractor, the Materiel Developer must 
continue WBS development to a point where either the contractor has enough information to 
develop the system needed by the warfighter, or any contractor derived solution that meets the 
stated performance requirements is acceptable.  While easily stated, this presents a daunting 
challenge in complex systems, especially those that are software-intensive. 
Software engineering is not mature, and there are few industry-wide standards for 
languages, tools, architectures, reuse, or procedures.  Software developed for complex weapon 
systems is typically started from scratch with each new system; very little existing software code 
is reused.  In addition, new languages and associated tools are introduced every few years.  For 
this and other reasons, software programs grow exponentially in size and complexity, expanding 
desired capabilities but limiting the maturation process.  The DoD Materiel Developer must 
recognize the relative immaturity of software engineering when developing the WBS for 
software-intensive systems and, more importantly, compensate for that immaturity. 
The current state of software engineering maturity drastically impacts an area of extreme 
DoD concern—Supportability.  Hardware-centric performance specifications rely heavily on 
mature engineering environments to account for a significant portion of the system’s 
supportability performance.  Using the automotive engineering example, there is little need of 
specifying supportability requirements such as features for oil, filter, tire and coolant 
replacement as they are industry-standard features that would be included in any competent 
design.  There are few corresponding software engineering standards for supportability 
features, and most commercially based software is not designed for long-term use as is typically 
the requirement for DoD systems.  There are literally hundreds of ways to build the architecture 
and construct the code for even the most basic software function.  Without physical or 
established engineering techniques, the software developer is bounded only by his or her 
imagination and creativity in satisfying broad specifications.  The resulting software may function 
correctly, but may not possess the OA design needed to effectively maintain, upgrade, or 
interface it with the constantly changing net-centric systems and environment. 
DoD acquisition professionals must recognize that the warfighter capabilities needed 
require software development techniques that differ significantly when compared to their 
commercially based counterparts.  The software engineering techniques used in short-lived 
software products may not prove effective in developing long-lived DoD software-intensive, 
warfighting systems.  DoD systems are designed to have a very long life span, including 
software-intensive systems, in direct contravention with most commercially based software 
designs.  The need for OA design—upgradeable, flexible, and highly reliable software that is 
maintainable over a long life span—is paramount to DoD’s warfighting systems, but industry-
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What this means to the DoD is that the capabilities analysis and resulting system 
performance specifications must be completed in significantly more detail to achieve software 
performance that meets warfighter’s needs.  The software developer needs to be driven to OA 
design by the performance specifications because software engineering discipline and state of 
the practice are unlikely to provide sufficient architectural designs without explicit performance 
requirements clearly communicated.  Providing more detailed performance specifications seems 
to run counter to acquisition reforms implemented to allow industry flexibility and innovation in 
achieving performance thresholds and goals, but that is not the intent.  The detailed 
performance specifications provide the software developer much more information about areas 
that the customer—the DoD—sees as critical to the overall system performance.  This will have 
a significant impact on the system software design supporting OA performance and will provide 
the basis for a much more accurate cost and schedule estimate in the proposal received. 
Near-term Challenges 
The net-centric warfare concepts feature system-of-systems in an elaborate network 
requiring a significant number of critical interfaces.  As each system is added or later upgrades 
its capabilities, it likely drives an interface change with other interfaced systems, necessitating 
the need for flexibility in accommodating interface changes from affected interoperating or 
networked systems.  It is easy to visualize dozens of software changes driven by upgrades in 
the interfaced components of the network and the critical need for effective OA designs to 
quickly and economically accommodate change over a long life span.  Again, this level of 
design flexibility is not a software industry norm for most commercially designed systems.  
Safety and Security requirements for DoD weapon system software have few 
commercial counterparts.  Obviously, commercially based critical medical equipment, aviation 
systems, and banking systems would also require a high degree of safety and security, but the 
combat environment weapon systems are intended to operate within, and the military lives that 
are always at stake adds to criticality of the need.  The net-centric warfare environment will 
necessarily require unprecedented security measures.  Software must be designed to continue 
to operate critical weapon systems in degraded modes, reject spurious input without freezing or 
failing, and resist intrusion, viruses and other attacks.  Anything short of that will put military 
members and the critical missions they perform at risk.  Most commercially based software 
engineering disciplines do not consider such stringent safety and security requirements.  The 
system’s OA design must allow for the flexibility needed while simultaneously ensuring safety 
and security requirements.  These two forces are rarely in concert and usually are in conflict. 
Considering the state of immature software engineering that exists today, it is clear that 
the DoD will not achieve the level of software-intensive system performance necessary if the 
WBS and performance specification are not developed more fully before hand-off to the 
developer or contractor.  Due to the pressure to shorten the acquisition timeline, there is a 
tendency to rush the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the prospective contractors without 
developing the WBS below level three or including the performance specification with sufficient 
detail.  This approach works with systems based in mature engineering environments as the 
contractor understands that all of those unstated requirements will be satisfied through the 
established engineering standards; thus, the proposed schedule and cost estimates will be fairly 
accurate.  With a software-intensive system, this is not the case due to many of the reasons 
presented earlier.  The most diligent contractor can only provide cost and schedule estimates 
based on what is presented in the RFP.  If a significant portion of the software development 
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substantial—and avoidable—funding shortfalls and schedule overruns that plague the 
development effort throughout the acquisition phase and well into the system’s lifecycle. 
A Methodology for Software OA Capabilities Analysis 
For DoD software-intensive systems to attain the broad spectrum of warfighter 
performance and long-term supportability with predictable costs and schedules, the Materiel 
Developer must provide performance specifications in the RFP that are detailed in areas that 
hardware-centric systems with mature engineering environments need not be.  In addition to the 
system’s software performance issues, the OA areas of Maintainability, Upgradeability, 
Interfaces/Interoperability, Reliability, Safety, and Security (MUIRSS) must be carefully analyzed 
to ensure that the potential contractors understand the Government requirements and 
constraints in each of these areas.  It is likely that the WBS will have to be developed several 
more levels in order to capture essential requirements; potential contractors would need to see 
such WBS development to form a realistic proposal with an executable schedule and an 
accurate cost estimate. 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) is the preferred technique for analysis within 
each of the MUIRSS categories as it provides a highly structured and comprehensive 
methodology for developing the WBS.  This will be a key tool for the DoD Materiel Developer in 
developing capabilities requirements and communicating them to the software developer via the 
performance specifications.  Recognizing the existing shortfalls in software engineering 
maturity, this methodology will greatly assist the software developer in understanding OA-
related performance requirements; this, in turn, will significantly influence the software 
architecture design and the level of effort estimated to build the desired system.  The alternative 
leaves the software developer estimating these requirements without the background or 
experience to do so, or worse yet, discovering the extent of the actual requirements after the 
work has begun. 
The capabilities analysis process must capture the OA performance needed for 
supporting the system throughout its lifecycle.  This analysis should drive a robust Post 
Production Software Support (PPSS) plan addressing the MUIRSS elements of the OA design.  
The MUIRSS elements are interdependent and tend to apply across the system and software 
architecture.  Each MUIRSS element is discussed in the following paragraphs to provide a basis 
for analyzing capability requirements within the area and capturing performance characteristics 
that are essential to the DoD. 
Maintainability   
The amount of elapsed time between initial fielding and the first required software 
maintenance action can probably be measured in hours, not days.  The effectiveness and 
efficiency of these required maintenance actions is dependent on several factors, but the 
software architecture that was developed from the performance specifications provided is 
critical.  The DoD must influence the software architecture through the performance 
specification process to minimize the cost and time required to perform essential maintenance 
tasks. 
Maintenance is one area where software is fundamentally different from hardware.  
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shortcomings, and we field it anyway.  There are a number of reasons why this happens; for 
instance, there typically is not enough time, funding or resources to find and correct every error, 
glitch, or bug, and not every one is worth the effort of correcting.  Knowing this, there must be a 
sound plan and resources immediately available to quickly correct those shortcomings that do 
surface during testing and especially those that arise during warfighting operations.  Even when 
the system software is operating well, changes and upgrades in other, interfaced hardware and 
software systems will drive some sort of software maintenance action to the system software. In 
other words, there will be a continuous need for software maintenance in the planned complex 
system-of-systems architecture envisioned for net-centric warfare.   
Because the frequency of required software maintenance actions is going to be much 
higher than in other systems, the cost to perform these tasks is likely to be higher as well.  One 
of the reasons for this is that software is not maintained by ”maintainers,” as are most hardware 
systems, but is maintained by the same type of people that originally developed it—software 
engineers.  These engineers will be needed immediately upon fielding, and a number will be 
needed throughout the lifespan of the system to perform maintenance, add capabilities, and 
upgrade the system. There are several models available to estimate the number of software 
engineers that will be needed for support; planning for funding these resources must begin very 
early in the process.  As the DoD has a very limited capability for supporting software internally, 
typically, early software support is provided by the original developer and is included in the RFP 
and proposal for inclusion into the contract or as a follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) 
contract. 
Upgradeability  
A net-centric environment composed of numerous systems developed in an evolutionary 
acquisition model will create an environment of almost continuous change as each system 
upgrades its capabilities over time.  System software will have to accommodate the changes 
and will have to, in turn, be upgraded to leverage the consistently added capabilities.  The 
software architecture design will play a major role in how effective and efficient capabilities 
upgrades are implemented, so communicating the known, anticipated and likely system 
upgrades will impact how the software developer designs the software for known and unknown 
upgrades. 
Trying to anticipate upgrade requirements for long-lived systems is extremely 
challenging to Materiel Developers, but is well worth their effort.  Unanticipated software 
changes in the operational support phase cost 50 to 200 times the cost in early design; so, any 
software designed to accommodate an upgrade that is never realized costs virtually nothing 
when compared to changing software later for a capability that could have been anticipated.  
For example, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Unitary was a requirement to modify 
the missile from warhead air delivery to surface detonation—that is, flying the warhead to the 
ground.  The contract award was for $119 million for the modification. The warhead was not 
new technology, nor particularly challenging to integrate with the missile body.  The vast 
majority of this cost was to reengineer the software to guide the missile to the surface.  Had 
there been an upgrade requirement for this type of mission in the original performance 
specification, this original cost (including potential upgrades, even if there were ten other 









OA design focuses on the strict control of interfaces to ensure the maximum flexibility in 
adding or changing system modules, whether they are hardware or software in nature.  This 
presupposes that the system modules are known—which seems logical, as most hardware 
modules are well defined and bounded by both physics and mature engineering standards.  In 
sharp contrast to hardware, software modularity is not bounded by physics, and there are very 
few software industry standards for the modular architecture in software components.  This is 
yet another area where the software developer needs much more information about operational, 
maintenance, reliability, safety and security performance requirements, as well as current, 
planned and potential system upgrades.  These requirements, once well-defined and clearly 
communicated, will drive the developer to design a software modular architecture supporting OA 
performance goals.  For example, if a system uses a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, it 
is likely that the GPS will change over the life of the system.  Knowing this, the software 
developer creates a corresponding discrete software module that is much easier and less 
expensive to interface, change and upgrade as the GPS system does so. 
With the system software modular architecture developed, the focus returns to the 
interfaces between hardware and software modules, as well as the external interfaces needed 
for the desired interoperability of the net-centric force.  Software is, of course, one of the 
essential enablers for interoperability and provides a powerful tool for interfacing systems, 
including systems that were not designed to work together.  Software performing the function of 
”middleware” allows legacy and other dissimilar systems to interoperate.  Obviously, this 
interoperation provides a significant advantage, but comes with a cost in the form of 
maintainability, resources and system complexity.  As software interfaces with other 
components and actually performs the interface function, controlling it and ensuring the 
interfaces provide the desired OA capability becomes a major software-management and 
software-discipline challenge.   
One method being employed by the DoD attempts to control the critical interfaces 
through a set of parameters or protocols rather than active management of the network and 
network environment.  This method falls short on several levels.  It fails to understand and 
control the effects of aggregating all of the systems in a net-centric scheme.  For instance, each 
individual system may meet all protocols for bandwidth, but when all systems are engaged on 
the network, all bandwidth requirements are aggregated on the network—overloading the total 
bandwidth available for all systems.  In addition, members of the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI) noted: 
While these standards may present a step in the right direction, they are limited in the 
extent to which they facilitate interoperability.  At best, they define a minimal 
infrastructure that consists of products and other standards on which systems can be 
based.  They do not define the common message semantics, operational protocols, and 
system execution scenarios that are needed for interoperation.  They should not be 
considered system architectures.  For example, the C4ISR domain-specific information 
(within the JTA) identifies acceptable standards for fiber channels and radio transmission 
interfaces, but does not specify the common semantics of messages to be 
communicated between C4ISR systems, nor does it define an architecture for a specific 
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Clearly, understanding and controlling the interfaces is critical for effective interoperation 
at both the system and system-of-systems level.  The individual program manager must actively 
manage all systems’ interfaces impacting OA performance, and a network PM must do the 
same for the critical network interfaces.  Due to this necessity of constant management, a 
parameters and protocols approach to net-centric OA performance is unlikely to produce the 
capabilities and functionality expected by the warfighter. 
Understanding the software interfaces begins with the software architecture; controlling 
the interfaces is a unique challenge encompassing the need to integrate legacy and dissimilar 
systems and the lack of software interface standards within the existing software engineering 
environment.  As stated earlier, the architecture needs to be driven through detailed 
performance specifications, which will help define the interfaces to be controlled.  An effective 
method for controlling the interfaces is to intensely manage a well-defined Interface Control 
Document (ICD), which should be a Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) deliverable on 
any software-intensive or networked system.  
Reliability 
While the need for highly reliable weapon systems is obvious, the impact on total system 
reliability of integrating complex software components is not so obvious.  Typically, as system 
complexity increases, maintaining system reliability becomes more of a challenge.  Add the 
complexity of effectively networking a system-of-systems (all of which are individually complex) 
to a critical warfighting capability that is constantly evolving over time, and reliability becomes 
daunting. 
Once again, the software developer must have an understanding of reliability 
requirements before crafting the software architecture and developing the software applications.  
Highly reliable systems often require redundant capability, and this holds true for software 
components as well.  In addition, software problems tend to propagate, resulting in a 
degradation of system reliability over time.  For example, a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 
suffered several flight control problems resulting in: a near stall situation, contradicting 
instrument indications, false warnings, and difficulty controlling the aircraft in both autopilot and 
manual flight modes.  The problem was traced to software in an air data inertial reference unit 
that was feeding erroneous data to the aircraft’s primary flight computer (PFC), which is used in 
both autopilot and manual flight modes.  The PFC continued to try to correct for the erroneous 
data received, adjusting flight control surfaces in all modes of flight, displaying indications that 
the aircraft was approaching stall speed and overspeed limits simultaneously, and causing wind 
shear alarms to sound close to landing (Dornheim, 2005, p. 46).  It is critical for system reliability 
that the software developers understand how outputs from software applications are used by 
interfaced systems so that appropriate reliability safeguards can be engineered into the 
developed software.   
Software that freezes or shuts down the system when an anomaly occurs is certainly not 
reliable nor acceptable for critical weapon systems; yet, these characteristics are prevalent in 
commercially based software systems.  Mission reliability is a function of the aggregation of the 
system’s subcomponent reliability, so every software subcomponent is contributing to or 
detracting from that reliability.  The complexity of software makes understanding all failure 
modes nearly impossible, but there are many techniques that software developers can employ 
when designing the architecture and engineering the applications to improve the software 
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software can be engineered with redundancy or ”safe mode” capabilities to vastly improve 
mission reliability when anomalies occur.  The key is identifying the reliability requirements and 
making them clear to the software developers. 
Safety 
Very few software applications have the required safety margins associated with critical 
weapon systems used by warfighters in combat situations—where they are depending on these 
margins for their survival.  Typically, the software developers have only a vague idea of what 
their software is doing and how critical that function is to the warfighter employing the weapon 
system.  Safety performance must be communicated to the software developers from the 
beginning of development so they have the link between software functionality and systems 
safety.  For example, suppose a smart munition senses that it does not have control of a critical 
directional component, and it calculates that it cannot hit the intended target.  The next set of 
instructions the software provides to the malfunctioning system may well be critical to the safety 
of friendly troops, so software developers must have the necessary understanding of 
operational safety to decide how to code the software for what will happen next.   
Software safety is clearly linked with reliability, as software that is more reliable is 
inherently safer.  It is critical that the software developer understands how the warfighter 
expects the software to operate in abnormal situations, degraded modes, and when inputs are 
outside of expected values.  Much commercially based software simply ceases to function 
under these conditions or gives error messages that supercede whatever function was being 
performed, none of which are acceptable in combat operations. 
Security 
With software performing so many critical functions, there is little doubt that software 
applications are a prime target for anyone opposing US and Allied forces.  Critical weapon 
system and networking software must be resistant to hacking, spoofing, mimicking, and all other 
manner of attack.  There must be capabilities of isolating attacks and portions of networks that 
have been compromised without losing the ability to continue operations in critical combat 
situations.  The software developer must know all these capabilities are essential before he/she 
constructs software architectures and software programs, as this knowledge will be very 
influential for the software design and application development. 
Interoperability challenges are increased when the system-of-systems have the type of 
security requirements needed by the DoD.  Legacy systems and existing security protocols will 
likely need to be considered before other security architecture can be effectively designed.  OA 
capabilities will be hampered by the critical need for security; both must be carefully balanced to 
optimize system performance and security.  This balance of OA and security must be managed 
by the DoD and not the software developer. 
Physical security schemes and operating procedures will also have an impact on the 
software architecture.  For example, many communication security (COMSEC) devices need 
only routine security until the keys, usually software programs, are applied; then, much more 
stringent security procedures are implemented.  Knowledge of this security feature would be a 
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pieces are uploaded to the COMSEC device.  The same holds true for weapon systems that 
upload sensitive mission data just prior to launch. 
Residual software on equipment or munitions that could fall into enemy hands presents 
another type of security challenge that needs to be addressed during the application 
development.  For example, the ATACMS missile air-delivers some of its warheads, leaving the 
missile body to freefall to the surface.  It is very conceivable that the body could be intact and, of 
course, unsecured.  If critical mission software was still within the body and found by enemy 
forces, valuable information may be gleaned from knowing how the system finds its targets.  We 
would certainly want the developer to design the applications in a way that would make anything 
recovered useless to the enemy, but this is a capability that is not intuitive to the software 
developers. 
Network Development 
The network is a lynchpin for the combat effectiveness of NCW architecture, and as 
such, should be developed under a professional Program Management (PM) organization.  The 
US Navy has achieved optimal results by assigning a PM for the Link 16 Program as noted by 
SEI: “The Navy created a PMO and funded it with money from affected programs.  These 
monies were returned to programs specifically to work toward Link 16 capability” (Morris et al., 
2004, p. 33).  SEI goes on to describe the need for professional program management by 
stating, “What is needed are processes that help to reach agreements, blinders that avoid 
getting distracted by things that are not related (e.g., portability), and to be agnostic about 
specific technologies (e.g., CORBA or Message Oriented Middleware)” (p. 34).  A network PM 
would help facilitate and broker those agreements to the benefit of the network, vastly 
increasing the probability that the NCW asset will provide the warfighter the capability and 
advantage visualized by DoD.  
Summary 
To get the needed Open Architecture performance the DoD is seeking for software 
components, the Material developer will have to specify it in the RFP and Performance 
Specification.  Unlike many hardware-centric engineering environments, the immature software 
engineering environment is unlikely to compensate for essential performance that is not 
specified.  With the Materiel Developer performing the capabilities analysis using the MUIRSS 
approach outlined above, the potential software developers will be provided a much more 
detailed understanding of critical capabilities the DoD expects from its software components. 
This same technique should result in significantly more accurate proposals as much 
more of the software development work can be estimated from the RFP and Performance 
Specification provided.  Yes, proposals will likely continue to be overly optimistic, especially in a 
competitive environment.  And yes, changes and details will still be revealed after the contract is 
signed—but the cost growth should be in the range of ten percent of the cost, not the current 
average of one-hundred percent of the original proposal.  Schedule estimates will also be much 
more accurate as the scope of the software work is better understood by the contractors, 
keeping schedule slippage to under fifteen percent of the original proposal estimate. 
Conducting this analysis will be as challenging as it is time-consuming, especially since 
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the RFP on the street.”  The enormous potential time and cost savings realized throughout the 
remaining development and the system’s lifecycle by completing the thorough MUIRSS 
capability analysis warrants the needed analysis time.  There is an old carpenter’s adage that 
applies well in this case: “measure twice, cut once.”   
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